Aretai

In this paper, my aim is to rely on Graeco-Roman sources to explore further the ways in which future directed imagination may quench, rather than fuel, our emotions. In this context, I take imagination to involve lingering in thought on possible future scenarios with or without picturing something to oneself. Thus, imagination differs from perception in that it does not require the imagined thing to be present, and it differs from memory in that it does not require the imagined thing to be something one experienced in the past. I focus in particular on the Stoics and the Cyrenaics. As Cicero reports (Tusc. 3.28-31; 3.52; 3.59), the Cyrenaics advocate pre-rehearsal of future evils (praemeditatio futurorum malorum) to prevent grief or distress. While there is no explicit report that the Stoic Chrysippus also endorsed this practice, Cicero’s reconstruction of his view at Tusc. 3.52; 3.59; 3.76 suggests that he could have endorsed it and he could have also explained how it works. Finally, Galen reports that the Stoic Posidonius also recommended pre-rehearsal, understood as dwelling in advance on the image of future evils. I look at how these practices work, and I show that they can be seen either as affecting the structure of our beliefs or as providing a sort of surrogate satisfaction or desensitisation.

If my reconstruction of these ancient sources is correct, it suggests that they uncover unexplored ways in which future directed imagination can affect our emotions. Unlike contemporary scholars, who focus on how future directed imagination and episodic future thinking affect planning (Ballance et al. 2022), or on how imagining future goods improves our well-being (Benoit et al. 2016), these ancient thinkers focus on the benefits of imagining future evils.

That is from a new paper in Apeiron by Elena Cagnoli Fiecconi.